Rolling the Dice on Precedent and Wagering on Legislation: The Law of Gambling Debt Enforceability in Kentucky after Kentucky Off-Track Betting, Inc. v. McBurney and KRS § 372.005 by Soukup, Jeffrey R.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 95 | Issue 2 Article 8
2006
Rolling the Dice on Precedent and Wagering on
Legislation: The Law of Gambling Debt
Enforceability in Kentucky after Kentucky Off-
Track Betting, Inc. v. McBurney and KRS § 372.005
Jeffrey R. Soukup
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Gaming Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Soukup, Jeffrey R. (2006) "Rolling the Dice on Precedent and Wagering on Legislation: The Law of Gambling Debt Enforceability in
Kentucky after Kentucky Off-Track Betting, Inc. v. McBurney and KRS § 372.005," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 95 : Iss. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol95/iss2/8
Rolling the Dice on Precedent and Wagering on
Legislation: The Law of Gambling Debt
Enforceability in Kentucky after
Kentucky Off-Track Betting, Inc. v. McBurney
and KRS § 372.005
Jeffrey R. Soukup'
I. INTRODUCTION
W HEN it comes to gambling and the law, all bets seem to be off. One of
the most heavily debated and controversial issues faced by Kentucky
citizens in recent years is the push for the expansion of legalized gambling
facilities and instruments throughout the commonwealth. Though such an
expansion has been building for over ten years,' the magnetism of this is-
sue has recently been exemplified in several major ways. In 2005, state rep-
resentative Tom Burch introduced a bill that would allow 21,000 video slot
machines throughout the commonwealth.3 The Kentucky Equine Educa-
tion Project, a coalition of the commonwealth's horse industry, called for
a referendum on a state constitutional amendment that would allow the
building of casinos.4 State Attorney General Gregory D. Stumbo opined
that such an amendment may not even be necessary, as he argued that the
state constitution's prohibition on "lotteries" should be read narrowly, not
disallowing gambling facilities. 5 In opposition, numerous individuals, busi-
nesses, and organizations have mobilized to fight the expansion of legalized
gambling in Kentucky.6 Polls, however, have indicated growing support for
gambling, both at racetracks and other locations.7
I J.D. expected 2007, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.S., Finance, 2004,
University of Illinois. The author wishes to thank his family and friends for their love and
encouragement.
2 Janet Patton, Tracks Renew Push for Casinos, Horse Industry Seeks Referendum Gathers
Broader Support, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Sept. 17, 2005, at Ai.
3 Editorial, Proposed Bill Takes Low Road to Gambling, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Aug.
15, 2005, at ioa.
4 Patton, supra note 2.
5 Ky. CONST. § 226(3); see 05-003 Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 2-3 (2005).
6 See Patton, supra note 2; Bruce Schreiner, Gambling Opponents Speaking Out, CINCINNATI-
KY. PosT, Jan. 20, zoo6, atAio.
7 See Janet Patton, KEEP Says its Poll Results Favor Casino Gambling, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Jan. 6, 2006, at A8. It should be noted, though, that this poll was conducted
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This well-publicized gambling expansion controversy evokes a compel-
ling legal issue that has been ignored by most-commentators-the enforce-
ability of gambling debt obligations under Kentucky law. The legal status
of gambling debts is a question that should command the attention of all
those interested in Kentucky's gambling expansion movement. Whatever
the answer, gambling debt enforceability will undoubtedly be a significant
factor in expanded gambling's impact on the future of the commonwealth.
This Note explains the significance of gambling debt enforceability, de-
scribes the state of the law regarding the issue, and offers predictions about
what changes may occur to this status. Part II8 gives a brief synopsis of the
background on the general rule against the enforceability of gambling debt
and offers reasons to believe that this rule may become less than abso-
lute. Part III, Section A9 explains the state of gambling debt enforceability
in Kentucky up through the key case of Kentucky Off-Track Betting, Inc. v.
McBurney,10 and particularly describes the constitutional and statutory ap-
proach to the issue and the historical stance of Kentucky courts against
holding such debt enforceable. Part III, Section BI1 further discusses why
the legal status of enforceability is far less clear in light of the 2000 enact-
ment of Kentucky Revised Statute section 372.005 (KRS § 372.005).2 Part
IV 13 examines other jurisdictions' positions on gambling debt enforceabil-
ity, with Section A' 4 covering out-of-state debts and Section B' s covering
in-state debts. Finally, Part V 6 examines Kentucky's position on gambling
debt enforceability in light of other jurisdictions' positions and predicts how
Kentucky's law against the enforceability of gambling debt may change in
light of the factors previously discussed.
II. THE ISSUE OF GAMBLING DEBT AND ENFORCEABILITY
The issue of the enforceability of loans made for gambling purposes is not
a new one; its public policy considerations and traditions stretch back to
both Roman Civil Law and English Common Law. 7 The lengthy history
by an organization "which is lobbying for casinos to help the horse industry," raising the risk
of polling bias. Id.
8 Infra notes 17-29.
9 Infra notes 3o-83.
io Ky. Off-Track Betting, Inc. v. McBurney, 993 S.W.zd 946 (Ky. 1999).
I i Infra notes 84-91.
12 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372.005 (West zoo5).
13 Infra notes 9z-132
14 Infra notes 93-1o6.
15 Infra notes 107-32.
16 Infra notes 133-44.
17 See Joseph Kelly, Caught in the Intrsection between Public Policy and Practicality: A
Survey of the Legal Treatment of Gambling-Related Obligations in the United States, 5 CHAP. L. REV.
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of the issue, however, should not beguile one into believing that the ques-
tion of gambling debt enforceability has been definitively answered. While
the almost complete unenforceability of gambling obligations used to be
indisputable law, this law is now far less certain both in Kentucky and in
the United States as a whole.
Considering the prevalence of gambling and gambling debts, a resolu-
tion of the now uncertain issue of gambling debt enforceability is critical
for the future of both Kentucky and the United States. As of 2006,48 states
allowed some form of legalized gambling, including large and small land-
based casinos, riverboat casinos, lotteries, racetracks, and manual or video
gambling machines. 18 The legalization of these various gambling activities
is not a phenomenon that occurred gradually; gambling was largely illegal
throughout most of the twentieth century, and this illegality was only re-
versed in the last twenty to thirty years. 19
The amount of money involved in these various gambling operations is
enormous. Total casino gambling revenues in the United States were esti-
mated at $51 billion in 2005 and are projected to increase to over $64 billion
by 2009.20 These statistics, however, do not account for most non-casino
87, 88-89 (2002). Kelly explains that many state laws prohibiting the enforcement of gambling
debt stem from adoption of the English Statute of Anne, a 1710 statute that both prohibited
gambling debt enforceability and provided a recovery action by the losing gambler. Id. at
87-88. Similarly, Kelly explains that some United States jurisdictions have exceptions to the
unenforceability law for gambling based on "skill," a tradition derived from Roman law. Id.
at 88.
18 Id. at 9o; see also Kavan Peterson, 48 States Raking In Gambling Proceeds, STATELINE.
ORG, May 23, 2oo6, http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeld- 136&language
Id= I&contentld= 1 14503. Casinos in particular are an extremely prevalent venue of gambling
in these states.
Bets can be placed in nearly 900 casinos-455 privately run in I I
states, 406 on Indian reservations in z9 states and 29 racetrack casi-
nos-known as racinos-in II states. And at least nine states (Delaware,
Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Ohio and Texas) are considering opening their doors to casino or race-
track gambling.
Id.
19 See John Warren Kindt, Diminishing or Negating the Multiplier Effect: The Transfer of
Consumer Dollars to Legalized Gambling: Should a Negative Socio-Economic "Crime Multiplier" Be
Included in Gambling CostlBenefit Analysis?, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 281, 308 (2oo3). By
comparison, "[i]n 1976, only a few states allowed gambling." NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY
COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, at 7-1 (1999) [hereinafter GAMBLING CoMM'N REPORT]. The National
Gambling Impact Study Commission was a government commission created in 1996 that was
charged "to conduct a comprehensive legal and factual study of the social and economic im-
pacts of gambling in the United States." Id., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at 2.
2o Howard Stutz, Gambling Study: Projected Revenue: $1oo billion, Casinos Expected to
Hit Mark by End of Decade, LAs VEGAS REV.-J., June 22, 2005, http://www.reviewjournal.com/
Ivrj-home/2005/Jun-22-Wed-2005/business/222 1014.html. These statistics "took into account
information from traditional casinos, both riverboat casinos and dockside gambling halls,
2oo6-2oo71
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gambling outlets, such as horse race betting and state lotteries. Factoring
in these other sources yields estimated revenues to the gambling estab-
lishments of approximately $73 billion in 2003 and possibly $100 billion
in 2006.21 Moreover, these statistics only account for the actual income to
the gambling establishments. The total amount legally bet in the United
States, on the other hand, was estimated at nearly $640 billion for 1997.2
This number increased to nearly $826 billion by 2000, the most recent year
for which this statistic could be obtained~z3
The growth of legalized gambling is widely understood to have caused
a corresponding growth of gambling debt 4 due to the ready availability of
credit for the purpose of gambling! 5 Sources of such gambling-related credit
abound. Casinos and other gambling establishments loan their patrons bil-
lions of dollars each year through devices called "credit markers." In 1997,
for example, over $2 billion were lent through credit markers by the casinos
in Atlantic City, New Jersey, alone. 6 Another method of extending credit to
gamblers is to offer cash advances on casino charge cards, which typically
carry very high transaction fees. 7 Credit cards are an additional source of
American Indian casinos and racetrack casinos." Id.
21 David R. Francis, Gambling: Where the Money Goes, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 19,
2006, at 16, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2oo6/o6 19/p 16soI -cogn.htm.
22 I. Nelson Rose, The Role of Credit in the Third Wave of Legal Gambling, in GAMBLING
AND THE LAW (Anthony Cabot ed.) at 2 n.io (1999), availabk at http:llgovinfo.library.unt.edu/
ngisc/meetings/ I nov98/rose.pdf.
However, this number, called the "handle," is inflated, because it
includes all wagers: If a player bets $25 and wins and then $25 and loses,
a total of $5o has been wagered, even though no money has changed
hands. A more accurate number for making comparisons with other in-
dustries is the gross revenue or "win," i.e. the amount players lose. Since
this is money left behind by customers after the gambling transaction,
it corresponds nicely with gross revenue or sales from other retail busi-
nesses.
Id. The gambling revenue statistics cited in the text above are examples of the "gross rev-
enue or 'win"' numbers Rose refers to. Supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
23 CHRISTIANSEN CAPITAL ADvISORS LLC, GRoss ANNUAL WAGER OF THE UNITED
STATES, 20O0 HANDLE BY INDUSTRY (2003), http://www.cca-i.com/Primary%2oNavigation/
Online%2oData%2oStore/Free%zoResearch/2ooo%20US%2oHandle%2oData.pdf.
24 GAMBLING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 19, at 7-14 ("The Commission found wide-
spread perception among community leaders that indebtedness tends to increase with legal-
ized gambling .... ).
25 See id. ("One of the issues of most concern to this commission is the ready availabil-
ity of credit in and around casinos, which can lead to irresponsible gambling and problem and
pathological gambling behavior.").
26 Id. at 7-14 to 7-15.
27 Id. at 7-14 ("Additional sums are charged by casino customers on their credit cards
as cash advances. Casinos charge fees for cash advances ranging from 3 percent to to percent
or more.").
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gambling indebtedness. In fact, some believe traditional credit cards are
even more widely used than the credit extended by gambling establish-
ments, as credit card debt does not need to be reported to state gambling
regulators. 8 As a result of such ready availability of financing for gambling
activities, "some individuals are able to spend far more than they can afford
and incur dangerously high debts." 9 With gambling expansion efforts un-
derway in Kentucky, and likely to continue in the rest of the United States,
Kentucky residents are likely to accrue even more gambling debt more
frequently. Therefore, whether such debt can be legally enforced when the
casino creditors take their patron debtors to court for collection is a ques-
tion likely to take center stage in the time ahead.
III. A HISTORY OF GAMBLING DEBT ENFORCEABILITY IN KENTUCKY
A. Gambling Debt Enforceability through
Kentucky Off-Track Betting, Inc. v. McBurney
In order to discuss the state of the law concerning the enforceability of
gambling debt in Kentucky, it is useful to discuss the constitutional and
statutory background of gambling itself in the commonwealth. Gambling
is addressed in section 226 of the Kentucky Constitution, which address-
es the constitutionality of state and charitable lotteries.30 Lotteries of any
kind were illegal in Kentucky until section 226 of the constitution was cre-
ated through the passage of amendments in 1988 and 1992.31 The 1988
amendment authorized state-operated lotteries, and the 1992 amendment
allowed "charitable lotteries" and "charitable gift enterprises."3" Discretion
was placed in the hands of the General Assembly to define "lottery, .... char-
ity," and the circumstances in which the use of them would be illegal. The
General Assembly also had discretion to regulate such instruments and
define proper penalties for violations therein.3 Most importantly, for the
28 Rose, supra note 22, at 6. Though states often require that casino-issued credit be
reported to state regulators, "there does not appear to be any reliable source for even making
a 'guesstimate' as to how much money gamblers are borrowing from other sources." Id.
29 GAMBLING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 19, at 7-15.
30 Ky. CONST. § 226.
31 Commonwealth v. Louisville Atlantis Cmty./Adapt, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 8Io, 814 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1997) (briefly discussing the history of section 226 of the Kentucky Constitution).
32 Ky. CONST. § 226(1)-(2); LouisvilkAtlantis Cmty., 971 S.W.zd at 814.
33 Section 226(2)(a)-(f) of the Kentucky Constitution reads:
(2) The General Assembly may by general law permit charitable lot-
teries and charitable gift enterprises and, if it does so, it shall:
(a) Define what constitutes a charity or charitable organization;
(b) Define the types of charitable lotteries and charitable gift enter-
2oo6-2oo7]
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purposes of Kentucky gambling law, the 1992 amendment also disallowed
"schemes for similar purposes, 34 providing a seemingly broad prohibition
on all other forms of lotteries and gift enterprises. The breadth of this pro-
hibitory scheme became the key question, as it arguably could have been
construed to encompass many forms of gambling, as long as they could be
characterized as "lotteries" or "schemes for similar purposes."
However, the particular gambling establishments for which Kentucky is
arguably best known, parimutuel horseracing systems 35 in which gamblers
can place bets either at the tracks or from off-track betting facilities,36 were
not subject to this constitutional prohibition on gambling. Long before the
prises which may be engaged in;
(c) Set standards for the conduct of charitable lotteries and chari-
table gift enterprises by charitable organizations;
(d) Provide for means of accounting for the amount of money raised
by lotteries and gift enterprises and for assuring its expenditure only for
charitable purposes;
(e) Provide suitable penalties for violation of statutes relating to
charitable lotteries and charitable gift enterprises; and
(f) Pass whatever other general laws the General Assembly deems
necessary to assure the proper functioning, honesty, and integrity of
charitable lotteries and charitable gift enterprises, and the charitable
purposes for which the funds are expended.
Ky. CONST. § 226(2)(a)-(.
34 Section 226(3) of the Kentucky Constitution reads:
(3) Except as provided in this section, lotteries and gift enterprises
are forbidden, and no privileges shall be granted for such purposes, and
none shall be exercised, and no schemes for similar purposes shall be al-
lowed. The General Assembly shall enforce this section by proper pen-
alties. All lottery privileges or charters heretofore granted are revoked.
Ky. CorNsT. § 226(3).
35 Parimutuel betting is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as follows: "A system of
gambling in which bets placed on a race are pooled and then paid (less a management fee
and taxes) to those holding winning tickets." BLACK's LAW DicTIONARY 1147 (8th ed. 2004).
Parimutuel betting is the method of gambling used in Kentucky's horse racing industry.
See Robert Lawrence & Richard Thalheimer, Go, Baby, Go! Keeping Horse Racing Healthy,
U. LOUISVILLE MAG., Winter 1999, http://www.louisville.edu/ur/ucomm/mags/winter99/
front&center.html ("Legalized gambling in Kentucky includes pari-mutuel horse racing, a
state lottery, and charitable gaming."). See also Hearing on Financial Aspects of Internet Gaming:
Good Gamble or Bad Bet? Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 192 (2001) (statement of Gregory C. Avioli, Deputy Comm'r and
Chief Operating Officer, National Thoroughbred Racing Association) ("Unlike most other
forms of gambling, horseracing uses the pari-mutuel system in which bettors wager against
one another instead of against the 'house."') [hereinafter Gaming Hearing]. Considering the
cultural and economic significance of horse racing in Kentucky, the importance of the parimu-
tuel system becomes obvious.
36 The Congressional hearings on internet gambling elaborated on this:
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above constitutional amendments were passed, Kentucky's highest court
specified that these parimutuel gambling establishments did not legally
constitute "lotteries."37 In accordance with this, statutory additions were
passed in 1992 that encouraged the use of such parimutuel facilities and
made clear that wagers there were not limited to cash, telephone accounts,
and credit cards, but could be placed in other forms as well.3"
Casino gambling, however, was understood to be prohibited by section
226(3) of the Kentucky Constitution (being considered a forbidden "lot-
tery" or "scheme for similar purposes") until 2005, when Attorney General
Gregory D. Stumbo drew a different conclusion.3 9 Going directly against
prior attorney general opinions, Stumbo argued that the constitutional pro-
hibition was only meant to address the sale of lottery licenses, and that the
framers of the prohibition were "confident gambling would continue to be
effectively regulated by statute, and further that statutory law, which is in-
herently more flexible than the dictates of a constitution, was the best way
to regulate other forms of gambling in the future."' Though the common-
wealth would have the power to prohibit forms of gambling as an exercise
of its general police powers, 4' according to Stumbo there is apparently no
constitutional barrier to the legalization of various forms of gambling, per-
haps including casino gambling. While only the courts can officially inter-
[Tioday over eighty percent of the money wagered on racing is
bet at facilities or locations other than where the race itself is run . .
. Another process for pari-mutuel wagering ... is account wagering,
whereby an account holder establishes an account with a licensed ac-
count wagering facility and is able to send instructions to place wagers
from that account via telephone or other electronic means without being
physically present at the facility. Currently, eleven states, including...
Kentucky... have enacted legislation specifically authorizing the accep-
tance of account wagers by licensed facilities within those States ....
Gaming Hearing, supra note 35, at 194.
37 Commonwealth v. Ky. Jockey Club, 38 S.W.2d 987, 994 (Ky. 193i) ("We are unable,
in the face of the facts recited, to declare that the section of the Constitution condemning
lotteries was understood by the people who adopted it as itself outlawing betting upon horse
races, by the pari mutual system, or the other forms of betting.").
38 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.215 (West zoo5) ("Further, it is the policy and intent of
the Commonwealth to foster and to encourage the business of legitimate horse racing with
pari-mutuel wagering thereon in the Commonwealth on the highest possible plane."); see also
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 230.379, 380 (West zoo5 ) (concerning the methods of wagering at pari-
mutuel facilities and the applicable restrictions).
39 05-003 Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 2-3 (2005).
40 Id. at 2-8.
41
It was then understood, and has been the accepted opinion, that the
subjects of betting and gaming were within the absolute control of the
police power, possessed by the Legislature. It is the duty and function of
the Legislature to discern and correct evils, and evils within that power
are not limited to some definite injury to public safety or morals, but
2006-2007]
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pret the constitution's language to decide this question, Stumbo's opinion
has further opened the door for the gambling expansion movement.
Due to the foregoing, the need for a more definite understanding of the
enforceability of gambling debt is crucial, as the issue presented is one of
liability. If such debt is held enforceable, the individual gamblers would
be held responsible for payment; if the debt is held unenforceable, the
gambling establishments would be unable to collect. Should the expansion
efforts succeed, more gambling would take place in Kentucky, logically re-
sulting in more gambling debt. A correspondingly greater amount of litiga-
tion would likely develop over efforts to have such debt enforced, thus
repeatedly raising the question about whether such debt can be enforced
in court.
Until recent years,4" this appeared to be a well-settled question in Ken-
tucky. A long line of cases stretching back into the 19th Century upheld a
strong statutory rule that contracts or assurances based on the consideration
of gambling winnings or losses are void and unenforceable.43 This rule
against enforceability, moreover, was maintained well into modern times.
The statutory ban on gambling debt enforceability in Lyons v. Hodgen,"
one example from this line of cases, is almost identical to the one at is-
sue in more recent cases.45 The apparent breadth of the statutes-"[e]very
contract.. . or assurance ... any game. . . or wager ... lent or advanced at
embrace the removal of obstacles to a greater public welfare. The power
is ample, coextensive with the duty, and equal to any exigency.
Ky. Jockey Club, 38 S.W.2d at 994.
42 Infra notes 84-91.
43 See, e.g., White v. Wilson's Adm'r, 37 S.W. 677 (Ky. 1896); Lyons v. Hodgen, 13 S.W.
1076 (Ky. 189o); Pace v. Martin, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 522 (1866); Brittain v. Duling, 54 Ky. (I5 B.
Mon.) 138 (1854); Brown v. Watson, 45 Ky. (6 B. Mon.) 588 (1846); Lyle v. Lindsey, 44 Ky. (5
B. Mon.) 123 (1844); Levy v. Perkins, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 505 (j817); Clay v. Fry, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 248
(1813); Richard's Adm'r v. Allen, 4 Ky. (i Bibb) 189 (18o8).
44
Every contract, conveyance, transfer, or assurance for the consider-
ation, in whole or in part, of money, property, or other thing won, lost,
or bet at any game, sport, pastime, or wager, or for the consideration of
money, property, or other thing lent or advanced ... at the time of any
betting, gaming or wagering, to a person then actually engaged in bet-
ting, gaming, or wagering, shall be void.
Lyons, 13 S.W. at 1077.
45 KRS § 372.OO reads:
Every contract, conveyance, transfer or assurance for the consider-
ation, in whole or in part, of money, property or other thing won, lost or
bet in any game, sport, pastime or wager, or for the consideration of mon-
ey, property or other thing lent or advanced for the purpose of gaming,
or lent or advanced at the time of any betting, gaming, or wagering to a
person then actually engaged in betting, gaming, or wagering, is void.
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 372.010 (West 2oo5).
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the time of any betting ... or wagering"--seems clear, and the courts have
found few limitations on their applicability in the past.
One possible limitation on the reach of the enforceability statutes, sug-
gested the Kentucky Supreme Court in Holzbog v. Bakrow,47 was the in-
ducement of an innocent third party. In Holzbog, the plaintiff was assigned
a note that was originally executed in consideration of the settlement of the
assignor's gambling debts to the defendants.48 The plaintiff had no reason
to know of the possible invalidity of the note, and the defendants assured
him that the note was indeed valid.49 Based on this misrepresentation by
the defendants, the plaintiff used the note as security on another note that
he executed to another party.50 When the defendants then denied the va-
lidity of the note after he tried to collect on it, the plaintiff claimed that the
defendants were estopped from doing so due to their inducement of the
plaintiff via a note that they assured him was valid.-" The Court held that
estoppel cannot be claimed between the original parties to the gambling
transaction, or between them and assignees who "simply stand in the shoes
of the original party.""2 This plaintiff, however, was different, since he knew
nothing of the underlying transaction and had no reason to suspect that the
note was invalid under the unenforceability statute. 3 He was "an innocent
purchaser who ha[d] been induced to purchase the paper by the represen-
tations of the maker."' 4 The key was that the plaintiff had no notice of the
note's invalidity as a gambling obligation.5 The estoppel principle appar-
ently would not have otherwise allowed the enforceability of the debt in
this case,56 despite the principle's usual application to other types of con-
tractual disputes.
46 Id. (emphasis added); Lyons, 13 S.W. at 1077 (emphasis added).
47 Holzbog v. Bakrow, 16o S.W. 792 (Ky. 1913).
48 Id. at 792.
49 Id. at 793 ("[Plaintiff] ... had no notice, knowledge, or information that there was
any invalidity, infirmity.., of such existing as against the note; on the contrary, until that time
[defendants] had assured him that the note was valid and had repeatedly promised to pay
it.").
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 794-
56
If he had notice of the infirmity of the note when he had the trans-
action with the administrator, he cannot recover; for the rule is that the
assignee of a note based on a gambling consideration, who knows the
consideration on which the note is based, cannot recover although the
makers of the note before he purchased it assured him that it is valid
2oo6-2oo7]
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Approximately forty years later, the Kentucky Supreme Court reached
an opposite result in Dobbs v. Holder,57 a case with facts similar to Holzbog.
Here, the defendant wrote a check to a party to whom he owed gambling
debts.18 The bank drawer stopped payment on the check, and after hearing
of this, the party purchased a car from the plaintiff and used the defen-
dant's check as payment for the car.59 The plaintiff was not aware of either
the check's origin in gambling payments or that the. bank had previously
stopped payment on it; the Court specifically noted that the plaintiff was
"4an innocent holder for value." 60 The situation is thus closely analogous
to that in Holzbog, with the exception that here the plaintiff was not an as-
signee of a note by the original party executing the note, but an assignee of
a check by the party originally receiving it.
Despite the similar facts, the Court reached the conclusion that the
check was still void because of the statute prohibiting the enforcement
of gambling obligations, stating that the innocence of the plaintiff to the
nature of this transaction was irrelevant for the purposes of the statute.
"The whole current of authority is that a check or other evidence of in-
debtedness based upon a gambling consideration is absolutely void, and
the obligor is not bound to even an innocent holder of the instrument.
61
The Court stated' that once an obligation is originally void by statutory de-
cree, simply circulating the obligation to other parties does not act to make
it legally binding.6 Otherwise, parties could circumvent declared public
policy against the enforcement of such obligations by assignment of the
void obligation.63 If the differences noted above between Dobbs and Holz-
bog are not considered significant, then Dobbs can only represent a retreat
from the Court's "innocence exception" to the general prohibition against
the enforceability of gambling obligations, and an affirmation of the broad
applicability of the statute.
The issue of gambling debt enforceability became more complicated
with the advent of the gambling expansion movement starting in the early
1990s and the passage of the above-noted legislation promoting racetrack
wagering and off-track betting facilities. 64 Specifically, the question regard-
ing enforceability turned to the nature of the public policy identified by
the Court in Dobbs: was public policy still against the enforceability of gam-
and will be paid.
Id. at 795.
57 Dobbs v. Holder, 242 S.W.2d 6o5 (Ky. 1951).
58 Id. at 6o6.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 606-07.
61 Id. at 607.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 6o8.
64 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 95
GAMBLING DEBT ENFORCEABILITY
bling debt? The passage of the parimutuel statutes and the constitutional
amendments allowing state lotteries6 indicated that public policy was be-
ginning to favor legalized gambling. If the policy against enforceability that
the Dobbs Court noted was derived from the assumption that public policy
was against legalized gambling, there would now be little basis for the strict
rule against the enforceability of gambling debt.6 The Court squarely ad-
dressed this issue in Kentucky Off-Track Betting, Inc. v. McBurney.
67
In McBurney, the defendant made a substantial number of unsuccessful
bets at the plaintiff off-track betting facility-betting that was legal due to
the passage of the 1992 horseracing statutes. The bets were originally paid
with a series of checks, but when the defendant admitted to the plaintiff
that his bank account had insufficient funds to cover the checks, the de-
fendant agreed to pay with a promissory note.68 The defendant ultimately
defaulted on the note and the plaintiff sought to enforce the obligation.
69
The defendant then argued that the note was void and unenforceable un-
der the aforementioned KRS § 372.010.70 The plaintiff, in turn, claimed
that the passage of the 1992 horseracing statutes implied that public policy
was now in favor of the enforceability of gambling debts, at least for those
incurred in a legal gambling transaction like the defendant's. 7' The plaintiff
continued that the unenforceability statute spoke to an older public policy,
one that had now been overturned by a new public policy more favorable
to legalized gambling." The policy of the unenforceability statute was thus
in conflict with that of the 1992 statutes, and the unenforceability statute
was therefore repealed by implication and could not be applied to hold
such gambling obligations void.
7 3
The Court, however, disagreed with the plaintiff and refused to enforce
the gambling obligation. It began by re-emphasizing a broad construction
of the applicability of the unenforceability statute. 7'4 The Court stated that
the defendant's checks, promissory note, and any verbal assurances to pay
were void, as "a check or other evidence of indebtedness based upon a gam-
bling consideration is absolutely void."' 5 The plain language of the statute
made the parties' exchanges unenforceable gambling transactions, as the
65 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
66 See Dobbs, 242 S.W.2d at 608.
67 Ky. Off-Track Betting, Inc. v. McBurney, 993 S.W.2d 946 (Ky. 1999).
68 Id. at 947.
69 Id.
70 See supra note 45.
71 See McBurney, 993 S.W.2d at 947.
72 See id.
73 Id. ("In effect, [plaintiff] argues that the statute prohibiting the lending of money for
wagering has been repealed by implication.").
74 Id. at 948.
75 Id.
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defendant accepted worthless checks while the plaintiff gambled, and al-
lowed the plaintiff to continue gambling on the basis of these checks.
7 6
After confirming that the checks and note in question fell within the
purview of the enforceability statute, the Court went on to uphold the con-
tinuing validity of the statute, stating that it had not been implicitly over-
ruled by the horseracing statutes." The Court explained that the policies
expressed by the enforceability statute and the horseracing statutes are not
directly in conflict with each other, and thus the courts are bound to uphold
them unless the legislature clearly expressed a desire to overturn one by
the passage of the other. "Courts will presume that where the legislature
intended a subsequent act to repeal a former one, it will so express itself
so as to leave no doubt as to its purpose." '78 Applying this presumption,
the Court said that the horseracing statutes were not meant to express a
new public policy in favor of gambling-a policy in conflict with the policy
of the enforceability statute-but rather were designed to "simply ... ac-
knowledge the various technological advances of modern times" by allow-
ing racetrack betters to legally do so at off-track betting facilities, since "[i]t
is now no longer necessary to physically go to a race track to place a bet."7 9
The real issue to the Court was "whether one may collect money loaned
or advanced to a person to bet while that person is actually engaged in bet-
ting," and this issue was independent from the one of the legality, or lack
thereof, of gambling.80 In the Court's eyes, the legislature did not intend
to make gambling debt enforceable by making further types of gambling
legal.
While the majority thus interpreted the statute so as to make gambling
obligations unenforceable regardless of the legality of the underlying gam-
bling acts in question, the dissent argued the opposite view-that the en-
forceability prohibition depended on the legality of the gambling itself.
"The purpose of [the enforceability statute] is to prevent illegal gambling
by rendering void and unenforceable the gambling contract itself and cer-
tain related agreements." 81 The dissent thus viewed the purpose of the
enforceability statute as stemming from a public policy against the legaliza-
tion of gambling. Hence, the dissent reasoned that the growing acceptance
of legalized gambling in Kentucky, as seen by the passage of the lottery
amendments and the racetrack statutes, showed that the policy of the en-
forceability statute was no longer relevant, and that gambling obligations
incurred in now-legal transactions should be enforceable in court. "The
social evil that [the enforceability statute] was designed to curb was gam-
76 Id.
77 Id. at 949.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 948.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 949 (Johnstone, J., dissenting).
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bling, an illegal activity at the time of the statute's enactment, not money
lent for a legal activity. 82 Since in the dissent's eyes the enforceability stat-
ute was designed to prevent a gambling legalization that had already oc-
curred, continuing to apply the statute so as to invalidate loans that were
made in valid gambling acts would be "preposterous."'
Thus, through 1999, the general unenforceability of gambling debt in
Kentucky was strongly established. Despite the apparent willingness of
the public to authorize an expanded menu of legal gambling activities, the
courts were unwilling to enforce obligations incurred in such legal activi-
ties, even with regards to innocent third parties.
B. Gambling Debt Enforceability After McBurney
The legislature, however, did not appear to agree with the McBurney Court.
Since McBurney was handed down, an important statutory change has oc-
curred that contradicts the Court's holding. KRS § 372.0051 was enacted
in 2000, just one year after McBurney, and, by its terms, seems to adopt
the position of the dissent.85 In providing that the terms and provisions of
chapter 372 are inapplicable with regards to "betting, gaming, and wager-
ing that has been authorized, permitted, or legalized," the statute appears
to prevent the unenforceability rule from applying to gambling debt that
was incurred in the pursuit of legalized gambling activities. s6 This statute
would seemingly apply to McBurney if the case were reheard. Based on
the content of the statute and the timing of its passage, it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that this provision was enacted to reject the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court's interpretation of the policies underlying the en-
forceability and horseracing statutes. The McBurney dissent's view, that the
passage of the horseracing statutes demonstrates a public policy shift that
debt incurred in legal gambling transactions should be held enforceable, is
reflected by the legislature.
KRS § 372.005 may represent an enormous turning point in the issue
of the enforceability of gambling debt in Kentucky. A literal reading of the
statute overturns decades of cases holding gambling debt strictly unen-
forceable, at least in cases that concern legal gambling transactions. Many
82 Id. at 950.
83 Id.
84 KRS § 372.005 reads:
The terms and provisions of this chapter do not apply to betting,
gaming, or wagering that has been authorized, permitted, or legalized,
including, but not limited to, all activities and transactions permitted
under KRS Chapters 154A, 23o, and 238.
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 372.005 (West 2005).
85 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
86 § 372.005.
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questions have yet to be answered about the full impact of this statute;
for example, whether all gambling obligations incurred in legal gambling
activities can be enforced or if there are instead implicit limits to the ap-
plicability of the statute. The issue is wide open, as KRS § 372.005 has not
been interpreted by any Kentucky court in a reported decision.
The Court of Appeals' recent holding in DeMoisey v. RiverDowns Invest-
ment Co., 7 may suggest the future direction of the courts with regards to the
new statute's impact. In DeMoisey, the executor of a deceased gambler was
sued in order to collect on a promissory note for the deceased's gambling
debt.88 Though the executor claimed that the obligation was void since the
gambling transaction was allegedly illegal under other statutory provisions,
he did not act to disallow the plaintiff's claim until over three years after
it was first pressed.89 The court, though acknowledging the existence of
both the enforceability statute and the new KRS § 372.005, held the claim
enforceable on unrelated grounds. 90 The court, therefore, did not need to
determine the legality of the underlying gambling transaction, and the pos-
sible impact of KRS § 372.005 was not addressed. 9
Despite the court's reluctance to interpret KRS § 372.005, DeMoisey still
constitutes a rare instance in which a Kentucky court held a gambling ob-
ligation enforceable-a particularly surprising result in light of McBurney's
strong holding. DeMoisey may thus be indicative of a future willingness of
the courts to embrace the McBurney dissent's view and enforce otherwise
legal gambling obligations. Put more specifically, DeMoisey may be the pre-
lude to a fairly broad interpretation of KRS § 372.005 in later cases. Only
time and further litigation will answer this question.
IV. OTHER JURISDICTIONS' APPROACHES TO THE
ENFORCEABILITY OF GAMBLING DEBT
Though the future of Kentucky's jurisprudence on the enforceability of
loans made for gambling purposes remains unclear, comparisons to other
jurisdictions may provide some guidance. As discussed earlier, the trend in
favor of gambling expansion is occurring throughout the United States, not
only in Kentucky, and this trend is having noticeable effects on enforce-
ability jurisprudence across the country. Analyzing the approach that other
states take to this issue can provide clarity on how a more gambling-friend-
ly Kentucky may approach it in turn. This analysis is two-fold, as creditors'
87 DeMoisey v. River Downs Inv. Co., 159 S.W.3d 820 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005).
88 Id.at8zi.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 822 (by failing to timely disallow the claim, the executor's inaction made the
claim allowable against the estate, and therefore enforceable).
9I Id. at 821 n.3 ("Because we hold that the claim was allowed and payable under KRS
Chapter 396, we need not decide the effect of the 2ooo enactment of KRS 372.005 .... ").
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claims to enforce gambling debts can be pressed either in the state where
the debt was actually incurred, or in the state that the debtor resides at the
time of the lawsuit.9" Judicial results vary depending on whether these hap-
pen to be the same state or different states. A proper analysis of compara-
tive state enforceability policies requires consideration of both scenarios.
A. Enforceability Outcomes When the Two States Differ
If the debtor's state of residency and the state where the debt was incurred
differ, the creditor may take two routes in his attempt to enforce the debt.
He may either obtain a judgment against the debtor in the state where the
debt was incurred (the "foreign debt/judgment") then seek to enforce this
foreign judgment in the state of residency,93 or he may instead attempt to
directly enforce the foreign debt in the state of residency.94 The former is
a clear issue with uniform results in all states-the foreign judgment must
be recognized by the courts of the residency state, and the debt must there-
fore be enforced.9
A more difficult question, however, is presented when the creditor
seeks to recover on the gambling debt in the debtor's state of residency be-
fore obtaining a foreign judgment in the state where the debt was incurred.
The outcomes of these cases seem dependent on the policies of the state
of residency towards gambling and enforceability-not those of the state
where the debt was incurred-since the outcomes of such lawsuits vary
from state to state. As such, they are very useful for a comparative analysis
of state gambling debt enforceability.
1. California.-In Metropolitan Creditors Service v. Sadri,96 the plaintiff, a Ne-
vada casino, attempted to enforce checks and memoranda of indebtedness
92 See Kelly, supra note 17, at 114-2j. The general structure of this subsection was
derived in large part from Kelly's article.
93 Kelly's article refers to this process as the registration of "sister-state judgments."
Id. at 114.
94 Seeid.atii6-2a.
95 The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution, providing that
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State," is the reason for this uniform result. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § i.
If the creditor were to obtain a valid judgment enforcing the debt in the state in which it was
incurred, the Constitution mandates that the judgment be accorded full faith and credit and
be upheld in the state of residency, regardless of public policy differences between the two
states on the issue of gambling debt. See Fautleroy v. Lur, 2 10 U.S. 230 (19o8). Further analy-
sis of this issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. As indicated, the results of this
doctrine are uniform throughout the United States. As such, they do not provide substantial
insight into the judicial stances that outside jurisdictions have taken towards gambling debt
enforceability as indicators of Kentucky's potential approach to the issue.
96 Metro. Creditors Serv.of Sacramento v. Sadri, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2nd 646 (Ct.App. 1993).
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executed by the defendant debtor, a California resident.97 The debts were
incurred while the debtor gambled in Nevada, but instead of first seeking
a Nevada judgment and enforcing it against the debtor, the plaintiff sought
direct enforcement of the debt in California. 98 Despite the fact that the
debt could have been legally enforced in Nevada, the court concluded that
the Constitution does not require enforcement of the debt in California:
A forum state must give full faith and credit to a sister statejudgment, regard-
less of the forum state's public policy on the underlying claim. However, the
forum state may refuse to entertain a lawsuit on a sister state cause of action if
its enforcement is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum state."
Concluding that the enforceability of foreign claims unsupported by for-
eign judgments is dependent on the forum state's public policy towards
the claim, the court dismissed the claim on the grounds that enforcing gam-
bling debts is against California's public policy. 1°°
2. Tennessee.-The opposite outcome was reached on similar facts in Robin-
son Property Group, L.P v. Russell.10 In Russell the defendant debtor, a Ten-
nessee resident, incurred lawful gambling debt in Mississippi. The plaintiff
creditor then brought suit in Tennessee to enforce the debt, without first
seeking a judgment in Mississippi. Though the court recognized that the
debt would not have been enforceable had it been incurred in Tennes-
see,"'2 it allowed enforcement of the debt, finding that the Constitution
provides that full faith and credit be given to Mississippi law where the
debt was incurred under it.113 The court did indicate that enforcement of
such foreign laws is not necessarily automatic (as is the case with foreign
judgments), stating that if applying the foreign law would "contravene a
strong public policy of Tennessee," then the laws of Tennessee would be
enforced, rather than the laws of Mississippi.1 4 However, the court argued
97 Id. at 647.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 648 (internal citations omitted).
IOO Id. at 653.
101 Robinson Prop. Group, L.P. v. Russell, No. Waooo-oo331-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL
33191371 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, zooo).
102 Id. at *3.
103 Id. at *4.
1o4 Id. at *3;
The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the
pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency or
fairness. They do not close their doors unless help would violate some
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good
morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.
Id. at *4 (quoting Cardozo, J., in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111 (I918)).
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that applying Mississippi law and enforcing the foreign debt would not be
against Tennessee public policy. The state's legislature had earlier allowed
parimutuel racetrack betting, indicating that gambling may not be per se
against public policy,' and not enforcing the Mississippi debt would re-
sult in "great injustice if Tennesseans could reap the benefits of gambling
in states where it is legal when they are successful, but seek shelter in
Tennessee courts when they lose."' 6 Enforcement of the gambling debt
was thus allowed, demonstrating that results in these situations are by no
means uniform, as with foreign judgments on gambling obligations.
B. Enforceability Outcomes When the Two States Are the Same
When the debtor's state of residency is the same state that the debt was
incurred in, results also vary by jurisdiction. Analyzing how other states'
courts rule on such in-state gambling debt lawsuits may provide insight on
how Kentucky's courts may act on this question when it arises again in the
commonwealth.
1. Wisconsin.-Some jurisdictions, despite the introduction of legalized
gambling into the state, have taken the position of the majority in McBur-
ney; that even a shifting public policy favoring legalized gambling does not
indicate a similar shift towards the enforceability of gambling debt. In State
v. Gonnelly, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals dealt with this issue when the
plaintiff attempted to enforce checks that the defendant debtor cashed at
a kennel club.0 7 After noting that the checks are unenforceable gambling
contracts under the relevant state statute, the court rejected the argument
that the legalization of various gambling activities in Wisconsin implies that
debts incurred in such activities were meant to be enforced. 08 Much like
the McBurney Court, this court said that repeal by implication was not a fa-
vored approach, and further, that the policies in favor of legalized gambling
and against the enforceability of gambling debt are not logically inconsis-
tent.109 Importantly, the court pointed out that the statutes legalizing vari-
ous forms of gambling in Wisconsin contained no express exception allow-
ing debts incurred under these authorized gambling acts to be enforced,
indicating that this would have changed the outcome of the case."0
2. California.-Wisconsin is certainly not alone in taking this approach. As
discussed earlier, for example, these same arguments were made in Califor-
105 Id. at *3.
io6 Id. at *4.
107 State v. Gonnelly, 496 N.W.zd 671 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
io8 Id. at 674-75.
1o9 Id. at 675.
iio Id.
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nia in Metropolitan Creditors Service v. Sadri when creditors tried to enforce
gambling obligations that arose out of otherwise legal gambling transac-
tions. 1 ' Although this transaction originally arose in a different state and
was only sought to be enforced in California, the same reasoning and con-
siderations of policy that drove the court's decision not to enforce the debt
provide insight into its understanding of the state's public policy towards
the enforceability of gambling debt overall."' The court pointed out, as
the McBurney majority did, that the mere legalization of gambling transac-
tions in the state is not conclusive of the question of the enforceability of
gambling obligations, as the two issues rest on different matters of public
policy.1I3 However, just as in Gonnelly, here there was no statutory provision
exempting legalized gambling activities from any rules that might prohibit
the enforcement of gambling debts.
3. Indiana.--Other jurisdictions have taken a position that is more in tune
with that of the McBurney dissent: that in light of an increased tolerance
for gambling, denying the enforceability of debt incurred in such activities
would be illogical. One such jurisdiction is Indiana. In Schrenger v. Caesars
Indiana,"' the Indiana Court of Appeals held a gambling debt incurred at
a riverboat casino enforceable, despite the absence of an express statutory
provision allowing this outcome. In reaching this result, the court explained
that though gambling had historically been illegal in Indiana, recent statu-
tory enactments allowed the creation of lottery, racetrack, and riverboat
gambling, indicating that "the current state of the law has carved out several
exceptions to [the] anti-gambling policy."'15 Furthermore, while Indiana's
long-standing policy was against the enforceability of gambling obliga-
tions, a recent statutory provision stated that riverboat casinos are allowed
to extend credit to their gamblers.'1 6 To the court, this was meant to be an
exception to the unenforceability rule with regards to riverboat gambling,
despite the absence of any express language to this effect in the statutory
iii See Metro. Creditors Serv. of Sacramento v. Sadri, i9 Cal. Rptr. 2nd 646 (Ct. App.
1993), supra notes 96-1 oo.
112 Id. at 648 ("The pivotal question is whether such enforcement is against the public
policy of the State of California.").
''3
[lit matters little that gambling itself has become more accepted
in California. The cornerstone of the ... rule against enforcement of
gaming house debts is not simply that the game played is unlawful, but
that the judiciary should not encourage gambling on credit by enforcing
gambling debts, whether the game is lawful or not.
Id. at 65 .
114 Schrenger v. Caesars Ind., 8z5 N.E.2d 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
115 Id. at 882-83.
116 Id. at 882.
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provision.117 The court thus allowed the enforceability of gambling obliga-
tions that had an underlying basis in legal gambling transactions, and it
did so on its own accord, arguably by its perception of state public policies
and without the express prompting of the legislature. A holding like this,
apparently based on a perceived shift in public policies towards legalized
gambling, is precisely what the McBurney dissent had in mind.
4. Maryland.-Maryland reached a similar result in Bender v. Arundel Are-
na, Inc.," 8 with the closely related issue of recovery of gambling losses.
Gambling losses have traditionally been recoverable at common law on
the grounds that preventing a gambler from recovering the money he lost
would be akin to enforcing a gambling obligation in court."1 9 Thus, deci-
sions regarding gambling loss recovery inherently turn on the same poli-
cy-based reasoning often employed in decisions regarding gambling debt
enforceability.1 0 Debt recovery cases therefore serve as further examples
of outside jurisdictions' enforceability policies. In Bender, the plaintiff gam-
blers tried to recover the losses they sustained at various bingo tables, slot
machines, and other legalized gambling devices, under a Maryland statute
117 Id. at 883 ("While we acknowledge that [the statute allowing the extension of
credit] does not explicitly refer to [the statute forbidding the enforcement of gambling debts],
our holding is that it effectively creates an exception for riverboat casino debts incurred le-
gally pursuant to [the statute authorizing riverboat gambling].").
118 Bender v. Arundel Arena, Inc., 236 A.2d 7 (Md. 1967).
119 See Kelly, supra note 17, at 87-88 (explaining that the Statute of Anne, the 1710
English statute that was the original legal basis for the unenforceability of gambling debts in
the United States, also provided that bettors could recover their gambling losses and litiga-
tion costs if brought to court); see also R. Randall Bridwell & Frank L. Quinn, From Mad Joy
to Misfortune: The Merger of Law and Politics in the World of Gambling, 72 Miss. L.J. 565, 637-38
(2002) (further demonstrating the importance of this recovery provision by explaining that "in
the absence of such a suit by the loser, allowing any other 'person or persons' to sue for treble
the amount of the loss, one half of the recovery going to the person so suing and the other half
going to the parish").
120 Compare
To permit a civil recovery for gambling losses is legislative recogni-
tion that the gambling which produced the loss was illegal. It would not
only be futile, it would be a contradiction in terms to say that a wager
lawfully could be made but if the licensed gambling establishment won
the wager it could not keep the stake.
Bender, 236 A.zd at i i (regarding gambling losses), with
It is preposterous that while it is legal to place a pari-mutuel wager
on a horse race at an authorized facility [because of the 1992 statutes],
and it is legal to loan money, it is illegal to loan money to someone to
place a legal wager on a horse race in this Commonwealth.
Ky. Off-Track Betting, Inc. v. McBurney, 993 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Ky. 1999) (Johnstone, I., dis-
senting) (regarding gambling debts).
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that allowed the recovery of such losses up to a certain amount., The
court held, in a similar fashion to the Indiana court in Schrenger, that losses
could not be recovered by the plaintiff gamblers even though the statutes
legalizing these .gambling transactions made no express reference to the
loss recovery statute.' The court argued that the disallowance of civil re-
coveries was intended by the legalizing statute despite the lack of express
language indicating this effect. 23 This seemed obvious to the court be-
cause the reasoning behind the recovery of gambling losses is tied to the
illegality of the underlying gambling transaction.2 4 Again, though the court
here does not specifically speak in terms of shifting public policies, the
basic argument of the McBurney dissent in favor of enforceability is clearly
beneath the surface of the Maryland court's reasoning.'
5. Illinois.-Moreover, some jurisdictions have reached the result that
gambling obligations incurred in legal gambling activities are enforceable
even without the need to justify it in terms of shifting public policies or
express statutory language. Illinois is one such jurisdiction, as illustrated
in Cie v. Comdata Network, Inc.2 6 In Cie, the plaintiffs obtained loans from
ATMs at legalized gambling establishments and used the cash to make wa-
gers at parimutuel facilities in the state. When the credit companies tried to
collect on these loans, the plaintiffs argued that these loans were made for
gambling purposes, and that under the relevant Illinois statute, such loans
are void and unenforceable.2 7 The court disagreed. First, the court held
that the loans were not gambling contracts, as they resulted from a credit
card obligation that the debtor promised to repay regardless of his winnings
121 Bender, 236A.2d at 9.
122 Id. at13.
123 Id. at i i ("It seems clear that the legalization of some forms of gambling in Anne
Arundel County had the effect of disallowing any civil recoveries against the gambling estab-
lishments [that were] licensed.").
124
To permit a civil recovery for gambling losses is legislative recogni-
tion that the gambling which produced the loss was illegal. It would not
only be futile, it would be a contradiction in terms to say that a wager
lawfully could be made but if the licensed gambling establishment won
the wager it could not keep the stake.
Id.
125 Compare id. at 13 ("[Bingo] has grown rapidly and tremendously since. 11928] ...
[Tihe legislature authorized the playing of bingo ... for the raising of money for churches,
charitable and fraternal enterprises, and volunteer fire companies. Since then the legislature
has authorized bingo games for similar purposes in fourteen more counties."), with McBurney,
993 S.W.zd at 950 ("[Iln the past decade, amendments to the Kentucky Constitution have
permitted a state lottery and charitable gaming. Statutory additions and amendments in 1992
legalized pari-mutuel wagering on horse racing at simulcast facilities .... ").
126 Cie v. Comdata Network, Inc., 656 N.E.2d 123 (I!1. App. Ct. 1995).
127 Id. at 125.
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or losses in gambling."2 8 The loans were thus made independent of the un-
derlying gambling activity, thereby placing them outside of the unenforce-
ability rule."2 9 Further, the court held that even if the loans were gambling
contracts, the enforceability statute could only be interpreted to deny en-
forcement to gambling contracts incurred in illegal gambling transactions,
not legal ones, as here. Taking a textualist approach, the court said that
the enforceability statute limits itself to gambling contracts entered into
for consideration "won or obtained in violation of the [Illinois] Gambling
Act."'30 As the underlying gambling activities here were legal ones, they
could not be "in violation of" the Gambling Act, and therefore, the debts
were enforceable."' The court thus achieved a change in the enforceability
status by statutory interpretation alone, without needing to make policy-
based arguments in light of gambling's legalization, as other courts have
done. Indeed, the court even stated its opinion that public policy against
the enforceability of gambling debts had not been altered by the legaliza-
tion of gambling.132
V. THE FUTURE OF GAMBLING DEBT ENFORCEABILITY IN KENTUCKY
Consequently, the question of gambling debt enforceability no longer has
a simple answer, as jurisdictions across the country have come to different
conclusions in the wake of the gambling expansion movement. Predicting
Kentucky's response to this expansion movement must now be done in the
context of a judicially uncertain environment. Some observations about the
likely direction to be taken by the commonwealth's courts in this matter,
however, can be made at this time.
When lawsuits over gambling debts and obligations arise again in Ken-
tucky's courts, the impact of KRS § 372.005 must be addressed. Though
the statute appears on its face to exempt legal gambling transactions from
the general unenforceability rule, neither its actual effect, nor its constitu-
tionality, have ever been tested in court. Indeed, the fact that the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in DeMoisey stated "we need not decide the effect of the 2000
enactment of KRS 372.005" '13 perhaps implies that the effect of the statute
may not be self-evident after all, and that its full extent needs to first be
128 Id.
129 Id. at 125-26 ("This is a simple contract having nothing whatever to do with gam-
bling. Accordingly, the general rule regarding gambling contracts in [the enforceability stat-
ute] does not apply to cash advances such as those obtained by Plaintiff Cie.").
130 Id. at 126 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
131 Id. at 129.
132 Id. at 128 ("[Wle note at the outset that Illinois public policy towards gambling on
credit has not changed simply because certain types of gambling are now legal.").
133 DeMoisey v. River Downs Inv. Co., 159 S.W.3d 82o, 8z n.3 (Ky. Ct. App. zoo 5 )
(emphasis added).
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judicially determined before observations can be made about the status of
enforceability law. If so, the question of the enforceability of gambling debt
remains open in Kentucky.
The legality of the underlying gambling transaction that the debt is
based on-will clearly be a deciding factor in such forthcoming cases. If
KRS § 372.005 is given its apparent intent by allowing the enforceability
of debts based on all legal gambling obligations, any debts based on gam-
bling transactions that have not been legalized would not be enforced. The
statute by its own terms only applies to "betting, gaming, or wagering that
has been authorized, permitted, or legalized."'m If the Kentucky Supreme
Court was so recently unwilling to extend enforceability to gambling debt
based on legal transactions,135 it would almost certainly be unwilling to do
so for those based on illegal transactions, at least in the absence of a statu-
tory command to do so.
As discussed, some outside jurisdictions have embraced the view that
gambling's legalization implies that public policy has shifted in favor of
enforcing gambling debt. To bring about this end, these courts have occa-
sionally given legalizing or exemption statutes the effect of enforcing gam-
bling debts, even in situations where such statutes do not expressly address
the issue of enforceability.13 6 The Kentucky Supreme Court, as seen in the
McBurney opinion, has clearly taken the view that the policies behind gam-
bling and enforceability are separate, and that a shift in favor of the former
does not imply an analogous shift in favor of the latter.'37
The enactment of KRS § 372.005, however, allows parallels to be drawn
to these outside jurisdictions, shedding light on potential approaches to
gambling debt enforceability that Kentucky may take in response to its
new statute. Wisconsin in State v. Gonnelly took precisely the position of
the McBurney Court towards enforceability but noted that the existence
of a statutory exemption for legal gambling debts might have changed
the case's outcome.'38 This seems to be the very kind of exemption provi-
sion that was added to the Kentucky statutes by KRS § 372.005. Similarly,
California in Metropolitan Creditors Service v. Sadri also followed McBurney's
holding, but in Sadri there also was no legal gambling debt exemption.1
39
Now that Kentucky has what appears to be such an exemption provision,
the Gonnelly dictum about enforcing legal gambling debts may be followed,
despite the McBurney holding.
134 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372.005 (West 2005).
135 See Ky. Off-Track Betting, Inc. v. McBurney, 993 S.W.2d 946 (Ky. 1999).
136 Seesupra notes Ioi-o6, 114-32 and accompanying text.
137 McBurney, 993 S.W.2d 946.
138 State v. Gonnelly, 496 N.W.2d 671 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992); see supra notes 107-1o and
accompanying text.
139 Metro. Creditors Serv. of Sacramento v. Sadri, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2nd 646 (Ct. App. 1993);
see supra notes 96-1oo, I 111-13 and accompanying text.
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This being the case, it should be noted that KRS § 372.005, though ap-
parently having the effect of making legal gambling debt enforceable since
it includes all of chapter 372 (which contains the unenforceability rule) in
its scope, never expressly references gambling debt enforceability. In the
absence of an express, unambiguous application of enforceability to debt
incurred in legal gambling transactions, a Kentucky Supreme Court clearly
opposed to enforceability could possibly interpret this statute in a way that
keeps such debt unenforceable. It could argue that, considering the long-
standing common-law unenforceability rule and the view against implying
a policy shift against such rules, the failure to specifically refer to enforce-
ability in express terms means that the rule of unenforceability remains
intact.
A lack of express statutory language regarding enforceability, however,
did not prevent states such as Indiana, Maryland, and Illinois from allow-
ing the enforceability of legal gambling debts (or with Maryland, to deny
the recovery of gambling losses). Indiana"4 and Maryland, "I as discussed,
overlooked the lack of express language allowing enforceability by mak-
ing policy-based arguments in light of the legalization of various forms of
gambling in the respective states-a position that Kentucky has rejected. 4 '
Illinois, on the other hand, did not resort to such policy arguments to al-
low enforceability; it simply interpreted its statute's language as implicitly
allowing enforceability for legal gambling debts. 143 It thus based its de-
cision entirely on statutory language. The willingness of these courts to
enforce legal gambling obligations despite any express statutory language
may indicate an enforceability jurisprudence fundamentally inconsistent
with that of the Kentucky Supreme Court. Predictions that Kentucky may
follow these courts' positions should not be made lightly.
However, despite any misgivings of the Court to interpret KRS §
372.005 in such a way that allows the enforceability of legal gambling debt,
the likelihood of this outcome is difficult to ignore. The natural reading
of the statute applies enforceability to debts incurred through legal gam-
bling by referencing the state code chapter containing the unenforceabil-
ity rule, even if not specifically referencing the unenforceabiliy provision
itself. This may be enough to convince a majority of the Court that public
policy now has shifted in favor of enforceability, especially considering that
the McBurney plaintiffs were making this argument without the aid of a
statute like KRS § 372.005. Even in outside jurisdictions that have taken
14o See Schrenger v. Caesars Ind., 825 N.E.zd 879 (Ind. Cc. App. 2005); supra notes
114-17 and accompanying text.
141 See Bender v. Arundel Arena, Inc., 236 A.2d 7 (Md. 1967); supra notes 118-25 and
accompanying text.
142 See McBurney, 993 S.W.zd at 946; supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
143 See Cie v. Comdata Network, Inc., 656 N.E.2d 123 (I11. App. Ct. 1995); supra notes
I 26-32 and accompanying text.
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the same approach to enforceability as the McBurney Court, the cases there
were dealing with repeal of unenforceability by implication, as McBurney
was, not with statutory exemptions to the unenforceability rule.1"
As a result, though the issue'of gambling debt enforceability in Ken-
tucky is still unclear due to its lack of case law since the 2000 enactment
of KRS § 372.005, it appears likely that when the courts do return to the
issue, they will find themselves bound to enforce otherwise legal gambling
obligations. For better or worse, the McBurney dissent has proven prophetic:
the future of gambling debt enforceability in Kentucky is now irrevocably
tied to the future of gambling in Kentucky.
i44 See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
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